In “Love Your Enemies,” author and American Enterprise Institute President Arthur Brooks offers a formula for healing a country divided: “Go find someone with whom you disagree; listen reflectively, and take care of him or her with respect and love. The rest will flow naturally from there.”
We build a good society; Brooks states, the way we build a great marriage: through love.
Brooks is right that how we speak to one another concerns. The language of contempt dissolves the trust. Contempt drives out any impulse we might have toward empathy and understanding, and it replaces reasoned argument with litmus tests for ideological purity.
Moving toward greater empathy, understanding, and intellectual openness will improve the quality of our public discourse and make us healthier, happier plus better human beings.
However, the shift that Brooks is championing will not be inspired by the exalted virtue of really like. It will be the fruit of the less-exalted tempered virtues of civility and tolerance.
A defender of Brooks’ thesis might say that I am splitting hairs – that it does not matter if we use the vocabulary of love or the language of civility and tolerance. However, words make a difference.
If we uncritically accept as the appropriate standard for the good society and toss aside civility and tolerance as “garbage standards,” we set ourselves up for failure.
To begin, as an expectation for the broader society, love is too tall an order. We learned this long ago from moral philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith, who observed that there are cognitive limits to how far we can extend our sympathy.
Genuine love requires close-in local knowledge that we cannot cultivate beyond a relatively small circle of family and friends.
The good news, though, is that love is not needed to achieve the good society. On this point, Nobel Laureate F.The. Hayek offered a significant distinction between the social norms that are essential to the small intimate purchase of known friends and family and the norms essential to the extended order of the broader community.
The right standard for the small band may very well be love. It is in this sphere that we have enough local knowledge to attend to particular needs in nuanced ways. However, as Hayek argued, if we apply this regular to society as a whole, we will destroy it.
Brooks tells us that expectations of civility and tolerance are too low of a bar; that if we want “true unity” in America, we must find our “shared whys.” However, unity is the wrong goal.
A country of self-governing citizens is not one of the shared ends; it is among shared rules: individual liberty, equality before the law, property rights and impersonal rules of contract, for example.
The cultural norms that correspond to such rules are those like civility and tolerance, norms that can be applied generally, without a great deal of close-in, local knowledge.
Expectations of civility and tolerance are usually admittedly cold and impersonal. That is why they are not sufficient standards for, say, a happy family life. However, it is their impersonal quality that makes them appropriate requirements for the broader modern society.
As cultural norms, civility and tolerance allow us to pursue our different ends without checking in with one another, without any expectation that people are aligning our beliefs and actions with some shared purpose.
Once we commit to unity – even as a direction and aspiration – the individual who diverges from the pack will always be seen as impeding progress toward the ideal. Moreover, therein is situated a formula for cruelty.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, it is the requirement of civility and tolerance that sets the foundation for the civil society, one characterized by pluralism and human thriving.
By not expecting more than we can offer, by not insisting on enjoying and unity of purpose, we leave the social space contestable, open to countless conversations, out of which we have the best chance of forging bonds of mutual respect and trust.
Brooks is correct that if we are going to overcome the culture of contempt, we need better conversational ethics, such as a commitment to humility, regard and knowledge-seeking curiosity in the face of disagreement. However, we do not need love to cultivate these practices. We need the tempered virtues of civility and tolerance.

The militia community is a mainly American subculture consisting mainly of disaffected, rural, white, right-wing Christians who think that the federal government’s authority is either broadly abused or outright null and void. The American persons must form armed paramilitary groups to be able to endure Washington and help to make their voice heard. The movement was mostly mixed up in early-mid 1990s and is apparently making a comeback recently following an election of President Barack Obama though it is not as powerful since it was at its peak.
They attract their name from the “well-regulated militia” clause of the next Amendment to America Constitution. While the entrenchment of such ideology is part of the right wing of the political range, they are distrustful of the Republican mainstream (specifically the neoconservative and neoliberal wings of the party), and frequently foundation their beliefs in paleo-conservatism, libertarianism, or some combination thereof instead. The association of the movement associated and infused with survivalist rhetoric about impending financial failure and societal collapse, along with conspiracy theories about the government, big business, gun control, and international institutions. For example, the US and the Roman Catholic Church, all covered up right into a message of reclaiming the “actual” America from these nefarious forces. As the militia motion does experience lots of cross-pollination with white nationalists, anti-Semites, and other components of the radical ideal. Most observers treat this as secondary to the movement’s chief ideology – certainly, during the movement’s elevation in the ’90s, numerous black separatist groups used the ethos of militias, now it attracts a big number of pro-Israel Christian Zionists who start to see the Jews as allies against the “arriving global jihad.” Additionally, there is the Jewish Defense League, closely ideologically linked to the late Meir Kahane’s defunct and outlawed Kach party.
Many of these organizations conversely look at themselves (or framework themselves to the general public) assets of residents organized and prepared to end up being called on by municipality when needed. The personal residents’ militias such as theirs were the “initial intent” of the Founders for civil defense and advice about local law enforcement. That is a half-truth. Although it holds true that, historically, authorities agencies (from the neighborhood sheriff to the condition) have asked private citizens during occasions of crisis or temporarily deputized own citizens. The condition constitutions consist of definitions of the “unorganized militia” as all males (usually between 18 to 45) for this function. It is a leap of logic to summarize this sanctions the forming of private paramilitary businesses not organized by nor identified by the government. The idea is “all males”, not a private group of individuals holding fringe sights proclaiming themselves “the” militia decidedly.
The motion is most heavily intense in rural areas, suburbia, and old Rust Belt municipalities in “red state” America, where bolstered by ethnicities of rural populism and (in the southern US) Confederate apologia. The politics and message of the motion tend to charm most to those individuals uprooted by the financial adjustments brought by globalization – family members farmers, small enterprises, blue-collar employees, “Reagan Democrats”, and others in the practical course and lower-middle course end of the spectrum. While at precisely the same time masking the real factors behind these changes, instead blaming their complications on liberals, foreigners, urban elites, and shadowy cabals of “globalists” and “international bankers” wanting to eliminate the American lifestyle. These same politics also oblige to deter those in the big towns, where cosmopolitanism, feminism, and multiculturalism are details of life instead of “creeping outside forces”. Where in fact the economies powered by white-collar professional occupations (like finance, healthcare, and high technology), and were, conservatives tend to be Catholic, Jewish, or libertarian than evangelical.